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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
CARRmRS-~l>GRAM NOT ORDER lli;QUIRED BY Bn.r, OF LADING-A car of 
oil was shipped over the defendant's line to the order of the consignor, 
"notify Royal Crown Soap Limited." Plaintiff purchased the cargo, and the 
bill of lading was indorsed to him. Upon arrival of the car at its destination, 
the defendant notified Royal Crown Soap Limited. Plaintiff was notified, and 
sent this telegram: "Am doing all possible locate documents in order stop 
demurrage suggest you establish bond to produce documents and unload car." 
The soap company advised the defendant of receipt of the telegram, and the 
carrier, relying upon this, allowed the company to unload the car. Held, the 
telegram was not authority to deliver without production of the bill of lading; 
that at best it was a suggestion as to how possession of the oil might be ob-
tained before the plaintiff could locate the necessary documents. First Nat. 
Ba11k of Chicago v. Rogers, Brow1i a11d Co., (1921), 273 Fed. 529. 
When no bill of lading is issued, the carrier is justified in treating the 
consignee as owner, and may deliver the goods to him without requiring 
presentation of a bill of Jading. Schlichting v. C.R. I. & P. R'y. Co., 121 Ia. 
502. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the . 
consignee was to gain possession of the goods without production of the bill 
of lading. Edelsto11e v. Schimmel, 233 Mass. 45. Where nothing appears in 
the bill of lading to the contrary, the carrier may treat the consignee as 
owner of the goods, and may deliver them to him without his producing the 
bill of lading. Pratt v. N. P. Express Co., 13 Ida. 373. If the carrier has 
notice of the fact that the consignee is not owner of the goods, delivery to 
him is conversion. Any kind of notice is sufficient. See Nat. Ba11k of Chester 
v. Atla11fa a11d Charlotte Air Line R'y. Co., 25 S. C. 216; Atlantic Navigation 
Co. v. Johnson, 27 N. Y. Super. 474- Proper indorsement of an order bill of 
lading gives the indorsee an unqualified right to the goods. Paxson Bros. v. 
Warfield, 6 Ga. App. 315. It is not a breach of duty for the carrier to sur-
render the goods to such indorsee without his giving the bill of lading to the 
carrier, though this was agreed to between consignor and carrier. Chicago 
Packing and Provision Co. v. S<Wamzah, Fla. a11d Westerii R'y. Co., 103 Ga. 
140 .. The carrier may not deliver the property to the consignee until the bill 
of lading is properly indorsed, if it is provided in the bill of lading that it 
shall be surrendered properly indorsed before the delivery of the shipment. 
So11tlzem R'y. Co. v. Massee a11d Felton Lmuben Co., 23 Ga. App. 309. Nor, 
if the bill of lading provides that it shall be surrendered only when indorsed 
by the consignor, may the carrier deliver the goods to the consignee, without 
such indorsement and surrender of the bill of lading, though the bill of lading 
directs the goods to the consignee or his order. Thomas v. Blair, 185 Mich. 
422. If goods are shipped to the order of the consignor, "notify'' a third 
person, at destination, a delivery to such third person is conversion by the 
carrier, unless by the order of the consignor. North Pe1111. R. R. Co. v. Com-
mercial Ba11k, 123 U. S. 727. If a carrier delivers goods without requiring 
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presentation of the bill by the consignee, and is forced to reimburse the 
consignor, it cannot later recover from the one to whom it delivered the 
goods, who has paid for them, as there is no delivery by mistake, according 
to the usual meaning of that term. Long Island R.R. Co. v. Strnctural Con-
crete Co., no N. Y. S. 379. Under the Carmack Amendment to the Inter-
state Commerce Act, a delivery of the goods by the last carrier without 
requiring a surrender of the bill of lading makes the initial carrier liable to 
any holder of the bill of lading. Winget v. Grand Tmnk Western R'y, 210 
Mich. 100. A shipping receipt naming a third person as consignee is not a 
bill of lading, and so need not be produced before delivery of the goods by 
the carrier. Gree1i v. B. and 0. R. R. Co., 2o6 Mass. 331. Nor is it neces-
sary that a non-negotiable bill of lading be surrendered or presented to the 
carrier before delivery of the goods. Pe1m. R. R. Co. v. Titus, 142 N. Y. S. 43 
When the consignee has made part payment, and tender of the balance due for 
tne goods shipped to the order of the consignor, it is wrongful for the con-
signor to withhold possession of the bill of lading; the consignee is equitably 
entitled to the goods, and the carrier under such circumstances is not liable 
for transferring the goods to the consignee. The Asiatic Prince, 108 Fed. 
287. Stipulations for production of the bill of lading before delivery of the 
cargo may be waived by the express or tacit consent of the consignor, as by 
having acquiesced in prior deliveries without the production of the bill of 
lading. Salberg v. Pa. R. R. Co., 237 Pa. 495. The test for determining 
whether there is an express waiver by consent, other than an indorsement 
and transfer of the bill of lading, seems to be whether the shipper has caused 
"the carrier reasonably to believe another person is the owner of the goods, 
and entitled to their possession. Thus, a conclusion contrary to that reached 
in the principal case was obtained in Schwarzschild and Sulzberger Co. v. 
Savamtah, Fla. and Western R'y. Co., 76 Mo. App. 623. The telegraphic 
instructions to the consignee in that case were: "Use your stuff. Get rail-
road inspection your car; receipt for same in damaged condition." So in 
Mitchell v. C. & 0. R'y. Co., 17 Ill. App. 231: "Do the best you can; what-
ever you do will be satisfactory." The construction placed upon the tele-
graphic authority in the present case, considered in view of the test enounced, 
is unquestionably correct. 
CHARITiltS-BEQUEST TO TowN ON CONDITION OF PERPETUAL CARE OF BURIAL 
LoT VALID-Testator bequeathed to a town, on condition that it perpetilally 
care for his burial lot, a sum greater than was needed for that purpose. The 
heir-at-law sought to secure such excess amount. Held, a good bequest to 
the town, which, under the statutory authority to purchase and hold real and 
personal property for public uses, may . take property by will on consenting 
to act as trustee of the fund for care of the burial lot. Petition of Tiittle 
(N. H. 1921) u4 Atl. 867. 
While a perpetual trust for the maintenance of a cemetery is valid, a trust 
to perpetually care for a grave violates the rule against perpetuities and is 
void, apart from statutory permission. McCartney v. Jacobs, 288 Ill. 568, 4 
A. L. R. u20, note, Shipper v. fodiistrial Trust Co. (R. I. 1920), uo Atl. 410. 
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'!'he reason is, of course, that the first is a charitable purpose, the second is 
not. Of efforts to circumvent this rule there is no end. In re Tyler (1891) 3 
Ch. 252, upheld a bequest on such a condition, where a larger sum than 
would be needed for that purpose was bequeathed, on the ground that there 
was nothing to show that funds for the care would not be secured elsewhere 
in order to secure the bequest, and so no part of the bequest would be used 
for the purpose. A similar bequest was upheld in Roche v. M. Dermott, 
[1901] I Ir. 394, though the court said the contract to care for the lot which 
the charitable society was required to enter into as a condition precedent to 
the gift taking effect, was unenforceable, binding on conscience only. In re 
Davis, [1915] I Ch. 543, approved in In re Tyler, s1tpra, but held that as the 
gift over was not to a charity the first gift was freed from the obligation to 
repair the graves. '!'he court took no notice of the argument urged on its 
attention that the fund was so small it would be entirely required to keep up 
the graves, and the charity would get nothing. A safer method of securing 
perpetual care is that of the principal case, viz., a bequest to a municipal cor-
poration having power to receive such trust funds in perpetuity. See also 
Shippee v. Ind1tstrial Trust Co. (R. I. 1920) no Atl. 410. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DISCRIMINATION AGAINST FoRSIGN CORPORATIONS 
-Defendant, a sheriff, levied on a motor truck belonging to plaintiff, a 
Pennsylvania corporation, for non-payment of the North Carolina license. 
Laws N. C. 1917, c. 231, § 72, imposed a license tax on automobile manu-
facturers with a proviso that the tax on such manufacturers who had invested 
three-fourths of their assets in state securities or personal property within the 
state should be only one-fifth of the amount imposed on others. Plaintiff 
sued to restrain the sale, asserting that the act denied plaintiff the equal 
protection of the laws, and was an attempt by the state to regulate interstate 
commerce. Held, (two justices dissenting), the act is unconstitutional. 
Bethlehem Motors Corporation v. Fly11t, 41 Sup. Ct. 571. 
'!'he Supreme Court of the United States, in the instant case, has added 
another decision on the position of the foreigu corporation in constitutional 
law, following along the path marked out in Westem Unioti Telegraph Co. 
v. Ka11sas, 216 U. S. I; P1tllmmi Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56; So1~them Ry. 
Co. v. Gree11e, 216 U. S. 400. Preceding these cases the doctrine had been set 
forth that since a state had the absolu'te right to exclude foreigu corporations, 
it therefore had the right to admit them on any condition it saw fit, Pa11l v. 
Virginia, 8 Wall, 168, except that the state could not prevent a foreign cor-
poration from doing interstate business within the state, Pensacola Telegraph 
Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., g6 U. S. I. Since 1go6 further 
qualifications have been added to the effect that the state cannot impose 
unconstitutional conditions, Donald y. P. & R. C. & I. Co., 241 U. S. 329, 
nor provisions contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment in regard to due pro-
cess and equal protection of the laws, Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, supra, 
Westeni Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, supra. In the case at bar the 
court say that either the corporation is within the jurisdiction of North 
Carolina or out of it, and if it is assumed that the plaintiff is within the 
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jurisdiction, in the sense of having an agent therein and doing business 
within the state, then it has been discriminated against. The proviso in the 
statute can be satisfied by a resident manufacturer, his factory and its :i;>ro-
ducts in the first instance being within the state; it cannot be satisfied by a 
non-resident manufacturer, his factory necessarily being in another state, 
some of its products only at a given time being within the state. But if it 
is assumed the corporation was not within the state, the act was an attempt 
to -regulate interstate commerce by levying a tax on imports, because a tax 
on an agent of a foreign corporation for the sale of a product is a tax on 
the product, and if the product be that of another state, it is a tax on com-
merce between states, and hence invalid. W eltoii v. Missouri, 9I U. S. 275; 
Darnell & Son v. Memphis, 2o8 U. S. n3. For other references see HENDER-
SON, TH£ POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN A.M!l:RICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, Chapter 6 et seq.; International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 
I35; i6 MICH. L. Rev. 264, 447; 9 MICH. L. Rev. 549; BEALE ForunGN CoRPoRA-
'rioNS, Chapter 5. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Excess PROFITS TAX-INVESTED C.APITAir-Plain-
tiff claimed a refund of $1,o81,184.61 paid as excess profits tax under title II 
of Revenue Act of 1917 (Ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 302 et seq.). The Act provides 
for deduction from income. of a sum equal to a certain percentage of the 
invested capital and surplus for the taxable year, which shall be exempt 
from the tax. Plaintiff had bought, in 1904. certain lands for $190,000, which 
increased in value to about $ro,ooo,ooo by 1912. Plaintiff declared a stock 
dividend against this increase, by taking back the old stock, and giving twice 
as much new stock in return. In the tax return for 1917, the assessor re-
fused to include the $ro,ooo,ooo increase as capital or surplus. On demur-
rer to the petition for refund, held: the demurrer should be sustained. La 
Belle Iron Works v. United States, (1921), 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 528. 
It was contended by the plaintiff that (1) the increase in value should 
be included as invested capital, or paid in or earned surplus; (2) should be 
considered as property paid in for stock under Sec. 207 (a) (2) of the Act; 
(3) that the construction based on cost alone was arbitrary, and violated due 
process of law. Most of the opinion is an interpretation of what Congress 
meant by "invested capital." It seems quite clear that Congress had in mind 
the cost basis, rather -than present value. The court disposed of the second 
contention by saying that the exchange of stock was a purely internal trans-
action, referring to Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. l8g, which decided that 
stock dividends were not income as regards the income tax. The court 
showed that the purpose of Congress was to tax income in excess of a certain 
return on the capital actually embarked in the enterprise, and called the ap-
preciation of value simply an unearned increment. This is not a new con-
ception of capital. In Bailey v. Clark, 21 Wall 284, a case arising under a 
Revenue Capital tax, it was said that the term applied "only to the property 
or means contributed by the stockholders as a fund or basis for the business 
or enterprise for which the corporation was formed." And see statement in 
Iii Re Simon, 268 Fed. loOO at p. loo8. For other examples of what is and 
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what is not "invested capital," see Cartier v. Doyle, 269 Fed. 647, holding that 
money put up by one of a partnership as security for loans to the partnership 
was invested capital for the e..'>:cess profits tax; and Tire Co. v. Iredell, 268 
Fed. 377, holdi~ that patents, rented out to third parties on certain royalties, 
were not invested capital. It is difficult to see any possible argument against 
the constitutionality of the Act. The court held it not to be unreasonable of 
Congress to adopt the cost basis, thus resting values on experience rather 
than on vague anticipation of market values. It was argued that the tax 
would operate so unequally as to deny due process, and two cases under the 
Fourteenth Amendment were cited; Southem Ry. Co. :v. Greene, 216 U. S. 
400, and Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S. 55. The latter 
involved a paving tax based on frontage and area, the tax being held invalid 
because of gross inequality. It was pointed· out that the Fifth Amendment 
has no equality clause, although it would seem that even under the Fifth 
Amendment, inequality, if sufficiently gross, would of itself show lack of due 
process. The paving tax case would be more analogous if the tax in the 
principal case were on capital, instead of on income. On the contrary, it is 
submitted that the tax burdens are borne less unequally with the cost basis, 
than if any valuation basis had been used. The principal case is valuable 
incidentally in helping to clear the legal-economic concept of value. Capital 
assets, converted into cash, were decided to be income for the income tax; 
Merchants Loa1i and Trust Co. v. Smietanka, (1921), 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 386; 19 
MICH. L. REv. 854. Unconverted capital assets, in the form of property, are 
neither capital nor income, but simply an unrealised, unearned increment. 
CoNSTITUTIONAr, !JAw-JumcrAr, Rsvmw oF ORDER oF A CoM:r.r1ssroN-
A water company in Pennsylvania appealed from an order of a commission, 
claiming the rate fixed by it to be confiscatory. A state statute authorized 
the reviewing court to ascertain whether such an order of a commission was 
"reasonable and in conformity with law." Under this statute the court re-
versed the order saying there had been an erroneous valuation of the com-
pany's property. On appeal to the state supreme court the latter held the 
reviewing court to be outside its jurisdiction in exercising its judgment as to 
the valuation of the property since there was competent evidence to support 
the finding of the commission. The United States Supreme Court held, that, 
under the construction given it by the state supreme court, the statute was 
unconstitutional in that it did not give the reviewing court the power to 
exercise its own judgment as to the facts and therefore denied due process., 
Brandeis, Holmes and Clark, JJ., dissenting. Ohio Valley Water Company 
v. Ben Avon Borough, et al, (June 1920), 253 U. S. 287, 64 L. Ed. 908. 
Rate making, historically and in its very nature, is a legislative function 
delegated to commissions for reasons of expediency. It is well settled, how-
ever, that the order of such a commission must be reviewable in a court at 
the suit of an interested party who deems it unjust, otherwise due process is 
denied. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line C.o., 2II U. S. 210. But as to the 
extent of this review the principal case presents a difference of opinion. The 
dissenting opinion states that a review of questions of law, including whether 
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the finding is reasonably supported by the evidence is enough. Interstate 
Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 222 U. S. 541; People v. 
McCall, 245 U. S. 345, (semble). But the majority hold that the reviewing 
court must have an opportunity to determine the issue "upon its own inde-
pendent judgment as to both law and facts." It will be noticed that this gives 
the court a broad~r scope than it has in reviewing the act of a judicial body, 
its power there extending only to the limits outlined in the dissenting opinion 
of this case. 2 ENcYC. PL. AND PR. 390. The cases cited in support of the 
decision, while clearly recognizing the right of judicial review to the extent 
allowed in the dissenting opinion, do not seem to go farther and hold that 
it extends to a review of the findings of fact themselves. It would seem that 
an experienced rate making commission would be more peculiarly fitted than 
a reviewing court for ascertaining the value of property. Such ascertainment 
is a matter of opinion based upon a study of the facts. If the opinion of the 
commission has been reached after a hearing which has allowed the interested 
party ample opportunity to present the facts, he should have no right to have 
a reviewing court again pass on the weight of these facts. It would seem 
that the holding of the principal case extends the scope of judicial review 
to include that which is not necessary for the protection of the individual 
under the due process clause, and it is submitted that practical difficulties 
will be found in the application of the doctrine. 
CoNTRAcrs-AcCEPTANCS To TAK£ EFFtcT IN Tm: FuTuru>-P placed an 
order for goods through D's traveling salesman. On receipt of the order 
D wrote, on October rst, saying that same would receive prompt attention; 
that since it was a first order P's credit would have to be investigated; but 
that just as soon as this investigation was completed he would be advised in 
regard to the acceptance of his order. On October 25th (certain prices having 
risen in the meantime) D wrote a second letter in which he stated that P's 
order had been entered for part of the goods only and that the other kinds 
had been withdrawn from the market pending the credit investigation. In an 
action for breach of contract for not delivering all the goods ordered it was 
held, that D was liable. Gilmer Bros. Inc. v. Wilder Mere. Co. (Ala. 1921). 
88 So. 854 
It is not clear from the opinion of the court whether it regards the con-
tract as having been completed at the moment when the letter of October 1st 
was posted, or at the moment when the credit investigation was finished. If 
it intended to decide the former the holding would clearly be erroneous, for 
then we should have a pretended acceptance seeking to bind the offeror 
subject to a condition not specified in his offer. Nothing is better settled in 
the law of contracts than that an act to be effectual to complete a contract 
must amount to an unqualified assent to the terms proposed in the offer. If 
it does not, it not only does not create a contract but in addition amounts to 
a rejection of the offer. Hyde v. Wrench, :5 Beav. 344; Minneapolis etc. Ry. 
Co. v. Columbus Rolling Mill Co., II9 U.S. 149. See also the numerous cases 
cited in 13 c. J. 281. sec. 86. However, where the offeree accepts the terms of 
the offer unqualifiedly, at the same time stating in effect that he intends his 
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acceptance to be effectual only upon the happening of a ilamed contingency, 
there is no reason why the law should not carry out his intention. In that 
event the contract is not formed until the contingency has happened. In the 
meantime either party is at liberty to withdraw. Of course there is always 
the possibility that the offer has been withdrawn or has lapsed between the 
time of the receipt of the offer by the offeree and the happening of the named 
contingency. It might also be necessary for the offeree to give notice of the 
happening of the contingency where, as in the principal case, it is one that 
lies peculiarly within his knowledge. This requirement would not prevent 
the contract being complete at the very moment that the contingency happens. 
Cf. Bishop v. Eato1~, 161 Mass. 496. See l WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 51a. 
CoNTRACTS-WAGERS-F1xmG Prucs BY FUTURE VAr.us.-Defendant de-
livered cotton to plaintiff "on consignment," plaintiff making a deposit with 
defendant of the market value of the cotton at the time of delivery, and the 
parties agreeing to adjust the price in a prescribed manner according to 
market quotations up to a future date, when, in the words of the written 
agreement, the cotton was "to be sold outright" to the plaintiff. Held that 
the deposit constituted the real consideration and that the agreement to adjust 
the price by the future value of the cotton was a separable wagering contract, 
and therefore void. Moore et al v. Seay and Co., (Tex., 1921) 228 S. W. 6Io. 
The court reaches its conclusion by holding that title passed on delivery 
and that thereafter the seller could have no legitimate interest in the future 
value of the cotton. To reconcile the principal case with cases in Texas and 
elsewhere in which courts have enforced agreements of buyers to pay a higher 
price should the article prove worth more than what was paid, the court says 
that those were not wagering contracts because the risk of loss was only on 
one side. But this is not the basis of the decision in this type of case. The 
ground that such cases go on, as appears where the deciding court takes the 
trouble to state the obvious, is that the parties to a sale can adjust the con-
sideration as they please so long as it bears a reasonable relation to the value 
of the thing sold. Smith v. Du11ca11, (Texas) 209 S. W. 140; Phifer v. Erwi11, 
100 N. C. 59; Ferguson v. Coleman, 3 Rich. L. (S. C.) 99; Phillips v. Gifford, 
104 Iowa 458; Newell v. Smith, 53 Conn. 72; Dixie foclttstrial Co. v. Benson, 
(Ala.) 79 So. 615. The fact that title has passed does not necessarily de-
stroy either party's interest in its future contingent value. Ferguso1i v. Cole-
man, and cases cited sitpra. It is true that when the contingency is a political 
election or something having no bearing on the value of the thing sold, pay-
ment adjusted by it is a wager. Da1iforth v. Evans, 16 Vt. 538; Bates v. Clif-
ford, 22 Minn. 52. But if the parties to a sale wish to pass title immediately 
and make the price the market value of the article at a future date, it is their 
privilege. See cases cited supra. In the principal case the court seems to have 
been overzealous to find a wager. It has applied some of the principles of 
futures to a present delivery contract and has failed to give this contract the 
benefit of the almost universally recognized rl,lle that even in futures, when 
actual delivery is intended, the contract is not a wager. Kinsey Co. v. Board 
of Trade of City of Chicago, 1g8 U. S. 236. 
234 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Co~NANT FOR TITI;e-WAY oF NECESSITY As AN INCU:MBRANCE.-Defen-
dant conveyed a farm by warranty deed to the plaintiff without mentioning 
the fact that a third party claimed a way of necessity over a portion of the 
same. This fact did not appear in the abstract and plaintiff had no knowledge 
of it until after the sale had been consummated. Plaintiff brought 'suit, based 
upon the covenant against incumbrances in the warranty deed, to recover 
damages. Held, there was an implied reservation in the deed with reference 
to the way of necessity and that it was not an incumbrance. Reed v. Bl!tm, 
( 1921) 215 Mich. 247. 
The principal case is based on a line of cases which hold that a deed of 
warranty does not estop the grantor to claim a way of necessity over the land 
granted. Schmidt v. Quinn, 136 Mass. 575; Briglta11~ v. Smith, 4 Gray (Mass.) 
297; New York & New E11gla1W Railr.oad Co. v. Railroad Com'r, I62 Mass. 
81. In this connection, and on such facts, courts have indulged in general 
expressions to the effect that ways of necessity are not incumbrances. These 
statements were seized upon by the court in the principal case and applied to 
a situation having nothing in common with the circumstances of the cases 
from which the statements were taken. A careful examination of these cases 
shows that the main question before the court was that of construction of the 
deed. And they have uniformly held that a way of necessity is an exception 
to the rule that deeds are construed in accordance with their terms,-that the 
generality of the covenant is limited and qualified by the nature of the estate 
conveyed. Such reasoning has no application to the situation in the principal 
case, where the main question is not that of construction of a deed but whether 
a way of necessity constitutes an incumbrance. An easement, generally speak-
ing, is an incumbrance, as for instance, in the case of a private right of way 
over the land conveyed. Blake v. Everett et al, l Allen (Mass.) 248; Wilson 
v. Cochran, 46 Pa. St. 229. And it makes no difference whether the easement 
arose by operation of law, without the· voluntary agreement ·of the servient 
owner. Railroad rights of way are generally considered incumbrances. Beach 
v. Miller, 51 Ill. 2o6; Quick, Adm. v. Taylor, II3 Ind. 540. Tax liens, though 
arising by operation of law, are held to be incumbrances. Almy v. Himt, 48 Ill. 
45; Eaton v. Clzesebrough, 82 Mich. 2I4- Also, dower rights. Walker v. Deaver 
79 Mo. 664; Bigelow v. Hubbard, 97 Mass. 19.:;. By analogy it would seem that 
a way of necessity, although arising by implication of law or fact, should be 
held to be an incumbrance. It is surprising that the court in the principal 
case has arrived at a decision for which there is no support in decided cases 
or in principle. 
CRIMINAL LAW-ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO Krr.r.-INTENT.-The defend-
ant shot at A with the intention of killing him, but accidentally hit and 
wounded B. He was indicted for an assault with intent to kill B. Held, 
defendant was properly convicted under the indictment. Jones v. State 
(Texas, I921), 231 S. W. 122. 
The principal case raises the question whether in the crime of assault 
with intent to kill, intent and violence must coexist in respect to the person 
assaulted. It answers in the negative. "The assault is only required to be 
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with an intent to kill; that is an intent to kill someone." Quoted with approval 
from Mathis v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 549. In charging an assault with 
intent to kill, where by statute a specific intent is made a part of the crime, 
undoubtedly that intent must be proved. Under such a statute A, intending 
to shoot B, but accidentally shooting C, cannot properly be convicted of an 
assault on C with intent to kill C. State v. Mitlhall. lQQ Mo. 202; People v. 
Keef er, 18 Cal. 637; Ann. Cas. l912A, lo63, note; contra, Callahan v. State, 
21 Ohio St. 3o6. Cases in which A shoots at C, supposing him to be B, 
should be distinguished, for here there is a specific intent to kill the person 
assaulted. McGehee ·v. State, 62 Miss. 772; People v. Torres, 38 Cal. 141. 
But where, as in the principal case, the statute by its terms makes criminal 
an assault with intent to kill, and does not expressly restrict the intent to 
kill to the person assaulted, A, intending to shoot B, but accidentally wound-
ing C, may be convicted of an assault on C with intent to kill. Mathis v. 
State, supra, 37 L. R. A. (n. s.) 172, note. The indictment in the principal 
case transcends the statutory requirement and restricts the intent to the 
person assaulted, and therefore. on principle, it would seem that an intent 
to kill the person injured is of the essence of the crime charged and should 
be proved. State v. Shanley, 20 S. D. 18. In view of the indictment, the 
effect of the court's decision is to treat the restrictive allegation as mere 
surplusage. 
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE oF OTHtt OFnNSES SHOWING SYsT:eM.-In a 
prosecution for larceny of a brooch, evidence was offered that the witness 
who had pawned this brooch for the defendant had similarly pawned other 
jewelry for him. There was no evidence as to where the defendant had 
obtained such other jewelry except some articles which, it appears, had 
been taken from the store from which the defendant was accused of taking 
the brooch, though in effect the defendant admitted that all the jewelry was 
stolen. The evidence of pawning the other jewelry for the defendant was 
held admissible to show a system under which his operations were con-
ducted. McClelland v. State (Md. 1921), u4 Atl. 584. 
One of the exceptions to the rule excluding proof of extraneous crimes 
is when the other acts are so connected by common features as to indicate 
a plan. I WlGMORE ON EVIDENCE, §346. But "there must be such a concur-
rence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained 
as caused by a general plan of which they are individual manifestations." 
ibid., §~04. A person who commits one crime mav be more likely to com-
mit another, yet, logically, one crime does not prove another and cannot be 
:;hown, unless there is a certain relation existing between them. J ay11es v. 
People, 44 Colo. 535. Disagreement as to whether such relation exists, and 
the confusing of evidence of system with evidence to show intent, motive, 
absence of mistake, and identity, has caused a seeming conflict in the deci-
sions. See People v. Moline11~, 168 N. Y. 264 62 L. R. A. 193; State v. 
Gillies, 40 Utah 541, 43 L. R. A. (n. s.) 776. Evidence of other crimes 
tends to confuse the defendant in his defense, raise a variety of issues, and 
be highly prejudicial to him. Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16; State v. Hyde, 
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234 Mo. zoo. Due to this fact, the test of relevancy of evidence to prove 
system should be rigidly adhered to and that part of the principal case here 
noted does not seem to comply with the test above quoted. Disposal of 
other stolen jewelry does not seem to show· a plan pursuant to which the 
brooch in question was taken, the two acts appear quite unconnected, with 
no concurrence of common features, and the holding seems doubtful in the 
application of the law to the particular facts as stated in the opinion. 
DEATH BY WRONGFUL A<::r-ACTION FOR BENE11IT OF Rsr.ATm5 OF 
DECEASED NOT MAINTAINABLE AGAINST WRONGDOER'S ADMINISTRATOR.-D's 
intestate shot and killed P's wife. Shortly afterwards the former died. P 
now sues D, as administrator, under a statute, which follows Lord Camp-
bell's Act, conferring on relatives of deceased persons a right of action for 
wrongful death. Held, action cannot be maintained against administrator 
after death of wrongdoer. Demezuk v. Jenifer (Md., 1921), II4 Atl. 471. 
It is a familiar rule of common law that personal actions die with the 
person. Statutes authorizing a right of action for wrongful death for the 
benefit of relatives of deceased, being in derogation of common law, are 
construed strictly. Where they follow the language of Lord Campbell's 
Act the decisions in the various states are unanimously in accord with the 
principal case, whether the action be commenced originally against the 
wrongdoer's administrator. Clark v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 527, L. R. A. 1916A, 
n42; Hamilton v. Jones, 125 Ind. 176; CarriKai~ v. Cole. 35 R. I. 162; or is 
sought to be revived against him, the wrongdoer having died after action 
brought and before jud'gment. Bates v. Sylvester, 205 Mo. 403, II L. R. A. (n. 
s.) II57; Kranz v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 155 Wis. 40, Ann. Cases 1915C, 1050. 
However, the action against the wrongdoer's administrator is upheld in a 
number of states, generally not by virtue of the statute conferring the right 
of action on the relatives of the deceased person, but by authority of some 
other statute expressly providing for the survival of personal injury actions. 
Devine v. Healy, 241 Ill. 34; Morehead's Admr. v. Bittner, 1o6 Ky. 523. 
Such statutes, when remedial in character, should be construed liberally. 
Hackensack Trust Co. v. Vanden Berg, 88 N. J. Law 518. A statute pro-
viding that no action except suits for penalties and for damages merely 
vindictive shall abate by the death of either party has been construed to 
extend the remedy under a Death Act against the representative of a deceased 
wrongdoer. The recovery for benefit of relatives of deceased is for the 
pecuniary injury to them alone, and the action cannot be considered as a 
punishment for the defendant. Collier v. Arringto1i, 61 N. C. 356. But see 
Davis v. Nichols, 54 Ark. 358, where an earlier statute providing for the 
survival of actions ex delicto by· and against the representatives of both 
parties was held not to extend the remedy, under a later statute following 
Lord Campbell's Act, against the administrator, the wrongdoer having died 
pending suit. It was held that the earlier statute applied only to prevent 
subsisting causes of action from abating, whereas the action for benefit of 
relatives was a new cause of action which the death originates. The statute 
on this subject in Texas expressly provides that, if the defendant die pend-
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ing suit, the action may be revived against his executor or administrator, 
but this does not confer a right of action against the latter where the wrong-
doer has died before the suit is brought. Joh11-so1i v. Farmer, 89 Tex. 6rn. 
The Maryland statute providing for the survival of personal actions expressly 
excepts actions for injury to the person where the defendant dies, and the 
principal case rightly holds that this statute does not help the plaintiff's cause. 
DIVOR~-VAI.IDI'l'Y OF Fo~IGN Dt~Ar.IMONY.-Parties were married 
in Iowa and removed to Arkansas, where the wife obtained a divorce, the 
husband being served by publication and no personal jurisdiction being 
obtained. No provision was made for alimony and the wife started a sepa-
rate action for alimony in Iowa. Held, the action was not maintainable. 
McCoy v. McCoy (Iowai, 1921), 183 N. W. 377. 
In another case, plaintiff was domiciled in New York and married 
defendant in Washington, D. C. Previously, defendant and X had been 
married in Missouri and had moved to Texas, which was their last matri-
monial domicile. X left defendant in Texas, went to Nevada, and there 
obtained a divorce. Defendant never appeared in the divorce proceedings, 
service being by publication. Plaintiff now claims the marriage between 
himself and defendant was invalid, as defendant was not legally divorced 
from X. Held, if the wife, at the time the divorce was procured, was domi-
ciled in Texas, her status there controls, and if Texas recognizes such a 
decree as was obtained in Nevada, on the ground of comity, it will be rec-
ognized in New York; as neither party to that decree was a New York 
resident, the state's policy of protecting its residents against foreign divorce 
decrees, based on constructive service, is not involved. Ball v. Cross (N. Y., 
1921), 132 N. E. xo6. 
The courts in the instant cases have again been confronted with the 
perplexing questions arising from the lack of uniformity in our state divorce 
laws. In Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, the husband and wife were 
domiciled in New York, when the husband left her and acquired in good 
faith a domicile in Connecticut, there obtaining a divorce based on construc-
tive service on the wife, who remained domiciled in New York and made 
no appearance. The wife subsequently sued for divorce in New York and 
obtained personal service on the husband, who pleaded the Connecticut judg-
ment as a bar. The United States Supreme Court held that the Connecticut 
decree rendered, not being based on personal jurisdiction, was not entitled 
to full faith and credit in New York under the federal Constitution. In 
Bates v. Bodie, 245 U. S. 520, L. R. A. 1918C, 355, the parties were married 
in Nebraska, but removed to Arkansas, and in a divorce proceeding the 
Arkansas court rendered a decree based on personal jurisdiction over both 
parties, and a,llowed certain alimony. The wife then commenced an action 
in Nebraska for a further amount of alimony, alleging that the value of 
certain Nebraska property had not been considered in computing the ali-
mony. The court held that the full faith and credit clause made obligatory 
the enforcement of the Arkansas decree in Nebraska and that that decree 
was a conclusive determination of the alimony to be given. It will be noted 
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that the Arkansas decree was rendered with personal jurisdiction over both 
parties and the question of alimony was distinctly raised and passed on in 
that court. In Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476, 34 L. R. A. (n. s.) no6, 
the complainant sought a divorce and alimony from the defendant, who 
pleaded as a bar a divorce rendered in Virginia. The matrimonial domicile 
was Tennessee, but defendant had left his wife and obtained a bona fide 
domicile ill Virginia before getting the divorce. The Virginia decree was 
based on publication and without service of process on, or actual notice to, 
the wife. Held, an action for alimony can be maintained by the wife still 
domiciled in the state of the matrimonial domicile of the parties, although 
the husband may have obtained a divorce from her based on service by pub-
lication in a foreign state. Here the court protects its own resident. In 
Joyner v. Joyner, 131 Ga. 217, 18 L. R. A. (n. s.) 647, the matrimonial domi-
cile was in Georgia, but the husband got a bona fide domicile in Kansas and 
obtained a divorce based on constructive service on the wife, she retaining 
her Georgia domicile. In a separate alimony suit in Georgia the court 
enforced the Kansas decree on the ground of comity and held it conclusive 
as to the amount of alimony. The wife had actual notice by mail. To be 
effective to cut off further suit for alimony in another state, the decree 
must be valid in that other state either because of the full faith and credit 
clause or because of comity. If the decree is valid, since alimony is inci-
dental to the marriage relation, and as divorce dissolves that relation, nothing 
then remains from which the alimony can arise. Roe v. Roe, 52 Kan. 724 
See also Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill. 158. Contra: Th1trst01i v. Thursto1i, 
58 Minn. 279; Adams v. Abbott, 21 Wash. 29; Toncray v. Toncray, supra. 
The New York case at bar limits the doctrine of Haddock v. Haddock, supra, 
very strictly, applying it only when a resident of New York is one of the 
parties to the foreign decree and is injured by it. For further discussion, 
see 13 MICH. L. R.Ev. 420; II MICH. L. R.Ev. 508; L. R. A. I9I7B, 1032, note; 
L. R. A. I9I7F, n61, note; L. R. A. I9I5E, 42I, note; 9 L. R. A. (n.s.) 953, 
note. 
EQUI'.rY-INJUNC'.rION AGAINST WRONGFUL OUSTER OF PUBLIC OFFICER.-
The appellant held the office of clerk of the Recorder's Court in Detroit, 
by appointment, and was notified that the judges of this court had decided 
to dispense with his services, without having given him a hearing as to his 
competency. Held, that a court of equity had jurisdiction to enjoin the 
wrongful removal of the plaintiff. Beck v. Keidan (July, I92I), 2I5 Mich. 13. 
Other authorities have held that equity does not have jurisdiction to 
enjoin the removal of a public officer on the ground that its aid is sought 
to protect a political right as distinguished from property or civil rights. 
The United States Supreme Court held that a Nebraska court had no power 
to enjoin the ouster of a police judge upon action by only three members 
of the city council when an ordinance required action by the whole council. 
In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200. The court relied upon Gee v. Pritchard, 2 
Swanst. 403, which held that equity jurisdiction was limited to the protection 
of property rights. But see EQuITABL~ RELmF AGAINST DEFAMATION, ROSCOE 
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PouNn, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640. In re Sawyer, supra, left the determination 
of the right to public offices exclusively to courts of law, which might exer-
cise this power by certiorari, error or appeal, mandamus, prohibition, writ 
of quo warranto, or information in the nature of quo warranto. That case 
is followed in Illinois, where the court refused to enjoin the removal of a 
physician appointed by the board of managers of the state reformatory. 
Marshall v. Board, 201 Ill. I. Similarly, an injunction was refused on the 
ground of lack of jurisdiction where it was sought to enjoin the removal 
of the keeper of the penitentiary and putting the sheriff in charge under a 
void statute. Corscadden v. Haswell, 177 N. Y. 499, 17 HARV. L. Ri>v. 575. 
In re Sawyer, supra, was also relied upon in a recent Indiana case, where 
the Appellate Court refused to enjoin certain school trustees who were 
alleged to be conspiring to prevent the plaintiff from assuming his duties as 
a newly-elected trustee. Haupt v. Schmidt (Ind., 1919), 122 N. E. 343. But 
immediately following this decision the Supreme Court of Indiana held that 
a supervisor of oil inspection was entitled to injunctive relief against a rival 
appointed by the state geologist, who was interfering with his duties, the 
court holding that the legal incumbent was entitled to protection until the 
right of the contestant was determined at law. Felker v. Caldwell (Ind., 
1919), 123 N. E. 794- In Texas a distinction is drawn between an injunction 
sought to protect the right to the office as against a rival claimant for the 
office and an injunction sought to protect the enjoyment of the office as 
against those who are making no claim to it themselves. The former is 
held to be a political right over which equity has no jurisdiction, and the 
latter is held a proper case for relief. For example, an injunction was refused 
to restrain a newly-elected officer from taking the oath of office until his 
election could be contested. Jacksoii v. Houser (Texas, 1918), 108 S. W. 
186. But it was held that an injunction would be granted in favor of an 
officer against one in possession of another office who claimed the right to 
perform the duties and collect the fees rightfully belonging to the plaintiff. 
The court pointed out that the inherently political dispute between rival 
claimants for the same office was not involved, in which case it admitted 
that it could not enjoin. Troilo v. Gittinger (Texas, 1921), 230 S. W. 233. 
Where the governor of Wisconsin summarily and without proper hearing 
attempted to remove the insurance commissioner, an injunction was granted. 
Ekem v. McGovem, 154 Wis. 157· In the principal case the court, in justi-
fying and limiting its decision, referred to the fact th11t there was no one 
claiming the office of the plaintiff, and it was only acting to protect the 
plaintiff's possession of the de jure and de facto office from wrongful inter-
ference. And it also admitted that its decision would not deter~ine the 
plaintiff's right to retain the office, but that the judges of the Recorder's 
Court might remove him after notice and a proper hearing. This does not 
seem to be an exercise of political jurisdiction, and the result appears desir-
able from the standpoint of the inadequacy of the plaintiff's legal remedy 
and from the standpoint of the public's interest in insuring the stability of 
public offices from wrongful interruption. 
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EQuI'tY-UNJi'AIR Co:MPE'tI'l'roN-"Mutt AND JEFF" PROTECT~ FROM 
"PIRACY."-Complainant was the originator of a "comic strip" popularly 
known as the "Mutt and Jeff" cartoons. These cartoons were copyrighted 
in the complainant's name and published in the San Francisco Examiner. 
Later the complainant continued the series under contract with the defend-
ant, publisher of the New York American. At the expiration of this con-
tract the complainant -agreed to continue the series for a syndicate and the 
defendant prepared to imitate the "Mutt and Jeff" strip in a manner likely 
to deceive the public into thinking the cartoons were the complainant's. In 
a· suit to restrain this imitation, held, defendant enjoined from use of words 
"Mutt" or "Jeff" and from publishing cartoons so like complainant's as to 
deceive. Fisher v. Star Cc. (N. Y., 1921), 132 N. E. 133. 
The decision is based squarely upon the jurisdiction of courts of equity 
to restrain unfair competition, no reliance being placed either upon copy-
_right law or trade-mark law. The great majority of cases have had to do 
with unfair competition in the manufacture and sale of goods. The leading 
authority for the protection of intangible property from unfair competition 
is biternational News Seruice v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, in which 
the defendant was enjoined from "pirating" news gathered by complainant 
and passing it off as its own in competition with the complainant. This case 
has been said by some to stand for the broad proposition that no one shall 
be permitted to appropriate to himself the fruits of another's labor. 32 
HARV. L. R:Jw. 566. However valuable as an ethical concept, such a sweeping 
proposition is hardly maintainable as a matter of law. 13 Ir.L. L. fuv. 7o8; 
18 MICH. L. fuv. 415; Bristol v. Equitable As.mrance Society, 132 N. Y. 264-
In the instant case the court, with admirable discretion, refrained from lay-
ing down any broad doctrine, preferring to decide each case on its particular 
set of facts. - The threatened imitation was found to be essentially unfair 
to the complainant, and no good would accrue to the public from refusing 
the injunction. It is to be noted that the instant case differs from the Asso-
ciated Press case in that here there is the typical "passing off" element, the 
defendant passing off its own work as the complainant's, whereas in the 
Associated Press case defendant was publishing complainant's news as its 
own. See 51 NAT. CORP. Rs.>. 242 for comment on previous litigation between 
the parties in the instant case. 
I 
( 
EvrntNCS-'I'RIAJ:;S--WHEN A CouR't MAY DIRECT A VERDIC't.-ln a suit 
for violating an agency contract, the defendant attempted to prove that the 
provision in question ·had been orally waived or annulled. The evidence of 
the existence of the provision: was so preponderant that no other conclusion 
was reasonably admissible. Held, the court·erred in refusing to instruct the 
jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff. Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Higgin-
botham (1921), 274 Fed. 316. 
At one time there was a rule to the effect that a mere scintilla of evi-
dence was sufficient to require a determination by the jury, but this has been 
abandoned by most courtS, the federal and various state courts holding that 
the test for direction of a verdict by the judge is the same as on a motion 
RECENT LWPORT ANT DECISIONS 
after verdict to set it aside as being against the overwhelming weight of 
evidence. Schofield v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 114 U. S. 615; Gunther 
v. Liverpool & Lo1ulon & Globe Ins. Co., 134 U. S. uo; Fornes & Co. v. 
Wright, Baldwin & Haldaiie, 91 Ia. 392; Market aiul Fulton Nat. Ba11k v. 
Sargent, 85 Me. 349 .. See also THOMPSON ON TluAI.s, Sec. 2245. However, 
the refusal of the New York court in McDonald v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 
167 N. Y. 66, to accept such a test as that laid down by the federal courts 
would seem to be well founded, inasmuch as setting aside a verdict involves 
a matter of remedy and procedure and gives a retrial by another jury, 
whereas a direction of a verdict is a matter of substantive and substantial 
rights and is generally final. The latter is in effect a ruling that as a matter 
of la\y the party can or cannot recover, whereas a verdict may be set aside 
and a new trial granted because it seems to the court that the preponderating 
weight of the evidence is the other way and that an opportunity should be 
given for the reweighing of the evidence on another trial. Between those 
views lie the decisions of courts recognizing different amounts of evidence 
as sufficient to require determination by the jury, such as "evidence tending 
to prove," Offutt v. The World's Colm11bia1i E~position, 175 Ill. 472; "evi-
dence from which, when undisputed, a finding would 'be justified," Ohio & 
Miss. Ry. Co. v. Dmm, 138 Ind. 18; "evidence legally sufficient to warrant a 
verdict," Catlett v. Ry. Co., 57 Ark. 46r; "where as a matter of law no 
question of credibility or issue of fact remains,'' M cD01iald v. Metropolitan 
St. Ry. Co., supra. As will be seen from an examination of the authorities, 
no clear-cut rules can be laid down for the determination of all cases, inas-
much as the weight of evidence differs in imperceptible degrees and is never 
precisely the same. But all courts would no doubt hold that where there 
is no evidence tending to prove the constituent facts set up by the party sus-
taining the burden of proof, or where the evidence is undisputed and con-
clusive one way, the court should direct a verdict. Gustaf son v. Eger, 126 
Mich. 454; Scott v. Nickm1i, 193 Pa. 371; Woodward v. Chicago, M. & St. 
P. Ry. Co., 145 Fed. 577; Toomey v. B. & S. C. Ry. Co., 3 C. B. (n. s.) 146; 
Wakelfo v. Londo1i & S. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 12 App. Cases 41. "No evidence'' 
has been interpreted as meaning "none that ought reasonably to satisfy the 
jury that the fact sought to be proved is established." Ryder v. W ombwell, 
L. R. 4 Exch. 32, reaffirmed in Metropolitan R. Co. v. Jackso1i, L. R. 3 App. 
Cases 193; State v. Prince (N. Car., 1921), 108 S. E. 330. Certainly there 
should be no question for the jury if the probative force of the evidence is 
so weak that it raises only a mere surmise or suspicion of the fact sought to 
be established. Joske v. Irvi1ie, 91 Tex. 574. As said in State v. Prince, 
supra, "the legal sufficiency of proof and the moral weight of legally suffi-
cient proof are very distinct within the conception of the law. The first 
lies within the province of the court, the last within that of the jury. The 
province of the jury should not be invaded in any case, and when reasonable 
minds, acting within the limitations prescribed by the rule of law, might 
reach different conclusions, the evidence must b«: submitted to the jury." 
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INJUNCTION-LABOR UNIONS-EFFJ!CT oF CLAYTON ACT.-An injunction 
was issued against defendant labor union and individuals representing labor 
interests, prohibiting their interfering, by picketing, with the operations of 
a manufacturing company engaged in interstate commerce. Held, such an 
order did not violate the Clayton Act, Sec. 6 (COMP. S. 8835f), providing 
that the existence and operation of labor organizations is not forbidden and 
that such organizations and their members shall not be held to be illegal 
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under the anti-trust laws. 
Q11folivan v. Dail-Overland Co. (C. C. A., 6th Circ., 192I), 274 Fed. 56. 
Section 20 of the Clayton Act has frequently been before the courts, and 
it is now well established that that section of the act has not changed the 
law as it existed prior to its enactment as to the enjoining of labor unions 
which were acting in violation of the anti-trust laws. See Alaska S. S. Co. 
v. Longshoremm's Assn., 236 Fed. g64; Stephms v. Ohio State Telephone 
Co., 240 Fed. 759; Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443; IS MICH. L. Rsv. 
671. Section 6 is the other important section of this act which has to do 
with labor organizations. It begins: "The labor of a human being is not 
a commodity or article of commerce." This does not prevent the acts of 
combinations of laborers from coming within the purview of the Sherman 
Act if they interfere unlawfully with interstate commerce in commodities. 
KALES, CONTRACTS AND Co:MBINATIONS IN RssTRAINT OF TRADE, §I57. It is 
next provided that the anti-trust laws shall not be construed to forbid the 
e..-...:istence and operation of labor organizations instituted for the purposes 
of mutual help and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to 
forbid or restrain them or their individual members from lawfully carrying 
out the legitimate objects thereof. This is nothing more than common law; 
nor does the Sherman Act expressly or by implication forbid what this por-
tion of the act allows. But the converse is not true. The act does not allow 
such organizations to carry out legitimate objects unlawfully nor lawfully 
to act toward illegitimate ends. This is well pointed out in Dail-Overland 
Co. v. Willys-Overland (this same case in the court below), 263 Fed. I7I. 
The same case holds that after as well as before this legislation, injunction 
lies against a labor organization making an improper use of its powers. The 
concluding clause of Section 6 says that "such organizations [i. e., such as 
are described in the preceding excerpt] and the members thereof" shall not 
"be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint 
of trad'e under the anti-trust laws." Mr. Kales, in the work above quoted, 
Sec. I59, says: 'The care with which Section 6 affirms the legality of organ-
izations and acts which were valid at the common law, and therefore under 
the Sherman Act, raises the inference very clearly that labor organizations 
and the acts of such organizations, which, by reason of their being not 
merely for mutual help but for the purpose of monopoly and to exclude 
others from the ,labor market, were illegal at common law and under the 
Sherman Act, are still illegal under the Clayton Act." Subsequently decided 
cases have justified this position. The principal case, as well as the case 
below, refrained from passing on this point as well as on the first clause of 
the section; the court below saying that plaintiff, in asking for an injunction 
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against picketing, was not calling upon the court to decide that labor was a 
commodity or that the defendant union was a combination in restraint of 
trade. The principal case dismisses consideration of Section 6 with the 
statement that it did not apply to the facts. However, in Lamar v. U. S., 
26o Fed. 56!, it was held that this section does not prevent a criminal prose-
cution under the Sherman Act, for a conspiracy to restrain foreign trade by 
inducing or causing strikes, on the grounds that the act did not permit law-
ful organizations to be used for improper purposes. In Duplex Co. v. Deer-
ing, supra, the point was directly raised in the United States Supreme Court. 
This was a case of secondary boycott, which the court recognized as coming 
within the rule of Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 (holding that labor organ-
izations, while not unlawful per se, may be unlawful if they act in restraint 
of interstate commerce, contrary to the provisions of the anti-trust laws), 
unless the Clayton Act should forbid~ In interpreting Section 6, the court 
arrived at the same conclusion as Mr. Kales, saying: "There is nothing in 
Section 6 to exempt such an organization [i. e., a normal labor organization] 
or its members from accountability where it or they depart from its normal 
and legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination· or conspiracy 
in restraint of trade." The result of the decisions is that the Clayton Act 
has neither added to nor detracted from the law of equitable relief from 
the legally unjustifiable acts of labor organizations. 
LAw oF NATIONS-R.EcoGNITION-VALIDITY ABROAD oF Acrs oF AN UNRE-
COGNIZED GoV£RNM£NT.-The plaintiff was a Russian company which had been 
engaged in the manufacture in Russia· of veneer or plywood. The Soviet 
government confiscated its mill and manufactured stock. Subsequently the 
Soviet government sent to Great Britain a commercial delegation: under the _ 
headship of L. B. Krassin. Krassin sold a part of the confiscated veneer to 
defendants. When the veneer arrived it was claimed by the plaintiff company. 
Plaintiff's right depended upon the validity of the Soviet decree of confis-
cation. The validity of the decree in a British court, depended upon the 
recognition which Great Britain had given the Soviet Government. Com-
munications from the Foreign Office were admirably calculated to mystify. 
Defendants' solicitors were informed that "His Majesty's Government assent 
to the claim of the Delegation to represent in this country a State Government 
of Russia." To an inquiry from the plaintiff's solicitors, on the other hand, 
the Foreign Office replied as follows : "I am to inform you that for a 
certain limited purpose.His Majesty's Government has regarded M. Krassin 
as exempt from the process of the Courts, and also for the like limited 
purpose His Majesty's Government has assented to the claim that that which 
M. Krassin represents in this Country is a State Government of Russia, but 
that beyond these propositions the Foreign Office has not gone, nor, more-
over, do these expressions of opinion purport to decide difficult and, it may 
be, very special questions of law upon which it may become necessary for 
the courts to pronounce. I am to add that His Majesty's Government have 
never officially recognized the Soviet Government in any way." Roche, J., 
held that the Soviet Government had not been recognized, and gave judg-
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ment for the plaintiff. [1921] 1 K B. 456. The defendants appealed. There-
after the British Government concluded a trade agreement with the Soviet 
Government and the British Foreign Office announced that the Soviet Republic 
was recognized as the de facto Government of Russia. The Court of Appeal 
approved of Justice Roche's decision as based upon the evidence then pre-
sented, but unanimously reversed the decision and non-suited the plaintiff 
because of the recognition which had been extended meanwhile to the Soviet 
Republic. Luther v. Sagor & Company, 37 T. L. R. 777, 65 s, ]. 604. 
The case is an interesting illustratioru of the utter dependence of the 
courts upon the political departments of government in all matters pertain-
ing to the recognition of foreign states or governments. The question is 
discussed in 18 MICH. L. Rsv. 531. 
MARRIAGE-VALIDI'l'Y OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGI>.-A statute provided 
that marriages should be celebrated only by certain persons, and that any 
unauthorized person solemnizing a marriage should be fined and "such mar-
riage shall be void, unless it be in other respects lawful and be consummated 
with the full belief by either of the parties in its validity." Plaintiff and 
decedent had agreed to take each other as man and wife, and had cohabited 
as such. Plaintiff contended there was a good common law marriage, as 
the statute did not .expressly make such a marriage void. Held, that the 
marriage was invalid. The history and legislation of the colonists prior to 
the adoption of the common law indicates that a non-ceremonial marriage 
was not thought to be .suitable to our institutions, and hence the common 
law rule respecting marriages was never adopted by us. Wilmington Trust 
Co. v. Hemlrix-soti (Del., 1921), II4 Atl. 215. 
The majority of American courts hold: that a non-ceremonial marriage, 
being good at common law, is still valid, unless its validity is expressly nul-
lified by statute. Meister v. Moore, g6 U. S. 76; Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 
327; lT e'j1t11ami v. Heymann, 218 Ill. 636. It has been held in England by the 
House of Lords that a non-ceremonial marriage did not constitute a full 
marriage at common law, but only gave either party the right to compel 
solemnization by application to the ecclesiastical courts. . Regina v. Millis 
(1844), IO Clark & F. 534- This decision by the House of Lords came after 
many American courts had recognized that a non-ceremonial marriage was 
good at common law. Hence, in many American jurisdictions we have 
adopted as the common law what the House of Lords has declared was not 
the common law. Several American courts have, however, since that deci-
sion, held that a non-ceremonial marriage is valid, oecause at the time the 
common law was adopted in this country such a marriage was considered 
to be good. Dj•er v. Brannock, 66 Mo. 391; Carmichael v. State, 12 0. St. 
553. The Missouri court in Dyer v. Brannock, supra, stated that the com-
mon law adopted in this country was the common law as expounded by Sir 
William Blackstone and Chancellor Kent, and not the common law as ex-
pounded by the House of Lords. In Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361, the 
court followed the English rule, and held that as we have no tribunal, as 
in England, clothed with the power to enforce the solemnization of marriages 
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between parties contracting per verba de praesenti, this part of the com-
mon law was not adopted by them. The majority of American courts, how-
ever, holding that a common law marriage is invalid do so upon the ground ~ 
that statutes providing that marriages shall be celebrated by certain persons 
and imposing a fine upon any unauthorized person solemnizing a marriage 
are mandatory and not directory. Ann Gas. l912D, 597, and cases there 
cited. In several American states which formerly recognized a common 
law marriage the rule has been changed by statute. Sclmmacher v. Great 
Northem Ry. Co., 23 N. D. 231; Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal. 620; Ann Gas. 
l912D, 597. The principal case seems to be in accord with the legislative 
tendency to recognize as valid only a ceremonial marriage. 
p ARTIES-CAPACITY TO Sus AND BE Susn---UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS. 
-An unincorporated association was sued in its own name. Held, that even 
though there was a general appearance by tpe defendant, the court did not 
get jurisdiction, because a "suable party" is necessary to jurisdiction. Grand 
111ternatio11al Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green (Ala., 1921), 
89 So. 435. 
_At common law an unincorporated association cannot sue nor be sued 
in its own name, but only in the names of the individual members. Dien 
ON PARTIES, Rule 20, p. l6g. Many decisions support the view that the rule 
is one of form rather than of substance. In Beatty and Ritchie v. K1trtz, 2 
Peters 566, the members of a committee sued in their own names in behalf 
of an association, and Justice Story said: "* * * we do not perceive any 
serious objection to their right to maintain the suit." See also Guilfoil v. 
Arthur, 158 Ill. 6oo. Failure of the defendant to take advantage of the want 
of capacity to sue on the part of an unincorporated association by means 
of a demurrer or plea waives the defect. Franklfo Union v. People, 220 Ill. 
355. In Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union No. r6, 232 Ill. 402, an 
injunction issued against an unincorporated association in its own name was 
sustained. The want of capacity to be sued was described as "but a tech-
nical objection" in Krug Furniture Co. v. Unio1i of Woodworkers, 5 Ont. 
L. Rep. 463. See, contra, The Proprietors of the Me.xicai~ Mill v. The YellOw 
Jacket Silver Mining Co., 4 Nevada 40, where the court held that a suit 
brought in a co-partnership associate name was a "nullity." In Crawley v. 
A111ericaii Society of Equity, 153 Wis. 13, the defendant, an unincorporated 
association, was sued in its own name. It answered and litigated the merits, 
and then raised the question of its capacity to be sued. The court said: 
"* * * in view of the tendency to more and more brush aside non-prejudicial 
technicalities in order that substantial justice may be done * * * if plaintiff 
so desires, the action may proceed to judgment against those who were 
members of the board of directors * * *·" Under similar facts, the court in 
Deems et al. v. Albaiiy & Canal Line, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3736, held that it 
was too late for the defendant to object that it was not properly sued'. More-
over, with respect to its capacity to sue or be sued, an unincorporated asso· 
ciation is regarded exactly as a partnership. DICEY ON PARTIES (2d Am. ed.), 
p. l]O. It has been held that where a partnership sued in its own name_ the 
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defendant waived the defect by going to" trial on: the merits. Ortez v. Jewett 
& Co., 23 Ala. 662; Moore v. Watts, 81 Ala. 261; Foreman v. Weil Bro~., 
98 Ala. 495; Mitchell & Bro. v. Railto1i, 45 Mo. App. 273; Fowler & Wild 
v. Williams, 62 Mo. 403. A judgment obtained by a partnership in the part-
nership name is valid. Ives v. Mtihlenburg et al., 135 Ill. App. 517; Be1111ett · 
v. Child, 19 Wis. 362; (dictmn) Weldo1i v. Fisher, 194 Mo. App. 573. Contra: 
Hitch v. Gray & Co., I Marv. (Del.) 400; Simmo1is .et al. v. Titche Bros., 
102 Ala. 317 (judgment by default). Where the defendant is sued in its 
partnership name and makes no objection, the defect is cured by verdict. 
Seitz & Co. v. Buffum & Co., 14 Pa. St. 6g; Simonton et al. v. Rohm et al., 
14 Col. 51. A judgment against a partnership in its partnership name is 
valid. In Heavrin v. Lack Malleable Iron Co., 153 Ky. 329, the court said: 
''In such a case partners actually making defense for and on behalf of the 
partnership, and for and on behalf of themselves in the partnership name, 
will be treated as the real parties in interest and as the real defendants, and 
therefore bound by the judgment. Any other rule would make the admin-
istration of justice depend not on a fair and impartial trial but on mere 
tricks and subterfuges." Contra: Weldo1i v. Fisher, supra; Metropolitati 
St. Ry. Co. v. Adams Express Co., 145 Mo. App. 371. The reason for 
describing a party by name is to identify him. Therefore, where parties 
without objection: allow themselves to be designated by the name of an 
association, and appear in court under that name, there would seem to be 
no good reason why the court should not take jurisdiction over them. 
Rur,E IN SHEr.LEy's CAs~!N'rERPRm'A'rION AND CoNS'rRUC'tION oF DEEDS 
AND Wrr.r.s.-S conveyed the tract in question to his wife for life, remainder 
to his daughters, A and L, and their heirs after them, and in case either or 
both A and L should die without heirs of their bodies, then the tract to be: 
divided between his son, L C, and his (L C's) heirs, and if only one should 
die without heirs, her half to be divided between the other and L C's heirs. 
L died without issue, and L C conveyed to M. In an action to try title 
between L C's children and M, held, that the words "heirs" and "heirs of 
the body" were used in a non-technical sense to mean children; that the 
words "either or" in the first condition were used by inadvertence, and thus 
L C's children were entitled to an undivided half of L's share in the tract. 
Shugart v. Slmgart (Tex. Civ. App., 1921), 233 S. W. 303. 
In a very similar case, the testator, after various specific gifts, left the 
residue of his real and personal property, comprising the bulk of his estate, 
to his wife for life, remainder one half to her heirs, or devisees if she should 
leave a will, and the other half to specified blood relatives of himself. The 
wife died intestate, and a few days later the testator became 1101i compos 
me11tis, remaining so until his death. In a bill praying for construction of 
the will, held, the Rule in Shelley's Case applies to the realty, and the wife 
would have taken a fee in one half had she lived, but since the devise lapsed 
the heirs of the testator are entitled! thereto. Belleville Savings Bank v. 
Aneshaeiisel (Ill., 1921), 131 N. E. 682. 
The Rule in Shelley's Case, that where, in the same instrument, a free-
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hold is limited to the ancestor and a remainder to his heirs, the word "heirs" 
is a word of limitation and not of purchase (1 Co. 104a), is admitted by 
both the Texas and Illinois courts to be a rule of law and not of construc-
tion, and is to be applied, if at all, regardless of the testator's intent. The 
question in every case is to determine whether "heirs" was used in the tech-
nical sense, as referring to those persons entitled under the laws of descent 
and distribution to the real property of one dying intestate, or is used to 
denote particular persons or class of persons. If "heirs" is used in the 
latter sense the rule has no application. Archer's Case, l Co. 66b; Van 
Gruttm v. Fozwell (1897), 22 App. Cas. 658; Stisser v. Stisser, 235 Ill. 207. 
In the Texas case the court reaches the conclusion that by "heirs" tli~ 
grantor meant "children" because of the indiscriminate use of "heirs" and 
"heirs of the body" and the impossibility of giving effect to the provision 
for dividing the -remainder between L C and his heirs. In the Illinois case 
the court says that the testator meant "blood relatives" of his wife when he 
said "heirs," and effect is given to his obvious intent as regards the person-
ality, although the court feels bound by the Rule as regards the realty. If 
it is meant by this that "heirs" was used in the technical sense-the testator 
supposing that his wife's heirs would be composed of her blood relatives, 
and not providing for the contingency which actually occurred, viz., his sur-
viving his wife and his incapacity for changing his will thereafter-then 
the two cases can be distinguished. It is felt, however, that the less con-
servative Texas court would have given effect to the testator's intent as 
regards both the realty and the personalty had the facts in the Illinois case 
been before it. 
SPJ::cnnc PSru;"oRYANCS---."Nm.L AND Vom" PRoviso CoNSTRUSD "Vom-
ABLF;" AT VSNDSs's 0Pl'ION.-Defendant agreed in writing to sell plaintiff 
certain real estate. The contract provided that if, for any reason, a good 
and marketable title could not be given, "this agreement shall be null and 
void, and the sum paid on account as above provided shall be returned by 
the party of the first part in lieu of all claims for damages or otherwise." 
Plaintiff contended that "11ull and void" meant "voidable" at the option of 
the vendee, and insisted upon such performance as defendant could give, 
though the title was not marketable. He.Id, (one judge dissenting), that 
defendant must give performance, apparently upon payment of full pur-
chase price without abatement. Medoff v. Va11dersaal (Pa., July, 1921), 
II4 Atl. 618. 
It is significant that the majority opinion was unable to disclose a single 
case to support its view. The dissenting judge cited three cases supporting 
the view that the contract was null and void as to both parties if the title 
was not marketable. In the first of those cases the contract provided that 
if the title was not marketable the agreement should be "void, and delivered 
up" and cancelled. The court said: "They might both think it would be 
equally to their interest that the agreement should be put an end to if the 
counsel of the purchaser should be of opinion that a marketable title could 
not be made." Williams v. Edwards (1827), 2 Simons 79. In the second 
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case the language of the agreement, was, "this agreement shall be void, 
and the above two hundred dollars refunded." The court said : "The pro-
vision is absolute that this agreement-1. e., the whole agreement-shall be 
void." Mackey v. Ames (1883), 31 Minn. 103. In the last case considered 
by the dissenting judge the contract provided: "It is agreed that if the title 
to said premises is not good, and cannot bCi made good, this agreement shall 
be void and the above $50 refunded." The court was of the opinion that 
the contract contained no ambiguity, and was void as to both parties, adding: 
"The rule of practical construction applies only in cases where the contract 
is indefinite, uncertain, or susceptible of different interpretations." Schwab 
v. Baremore (1905), 95 Minn. 295. The writer was able to find only one 
other case where the provisions in the contract were practically identical 
with those of the principal case. That case was decided like the last three 
considered. Marchman v. Fowler (1916), 145 Ga. 682. In Weatherford v. 
James (1841), 2 Ala. 170, the defendant contracted to sell certain lands if 
he could give a marketable title, and further agreed that if he could not 
give such title he would execute a mortgage upon certain slaves to secure 
l'epayment of the purchase money. He could not give a marketable title, 
but the court held that a conveyance with abatement could not be demanded 
of the defendant, the theory being that the contract to convey the land 
depended absolutely upon the contingency. For cases analogous to the 
principal case, in which it was held that the vendor could not be compelled 
to perform, see Duddell v. Simpson (1866), L. R. 2 Ch. 102; Mawson v. 
Fletcher (1870), L. R. 6 Ch. 91; Hoy v. Smythies (1856), 22 Beav. 510. 
For the same interpretation of a statute where a similar question was raised, 
see M1mdy v. Shellaberger, 161 Fed. 503. 
SPECIFIC P:e&FORMANct-Rm.mF ON TI-:RMS VARYING FROY TH~ CoNTRAC'l'. 
-Plaintiff contracted to buy and the defendant to sell certain real property. 
About $1,000 had been paid. On February l an interest installment fell due 
and was unpaid. On April 12 the vendor served notice of forfeiture pur-
suant to the terms of the contract. On April 23 he sold the premises to a 
third party, who had notice of the facts. On April 27 the plaintiff tendered 
the amount due, with the excuse that he had not known it was overdue. 
Tender was refused. Plaintiff sued for specific performance. Held, upon 
payment within 30 days of the entire unpaid purchase price (although the 
remainder of the price, amounting to about $3,000, would not have fallen 
due under the terms of the contract for some years to come), all interest 
and taxes in arrears, compensation for improvements made by the third 
party purchaser, $so attorney's fees, and costs, the plaintiff may recover. 
H11bbell v. Ohler (1921), 213 Mich. 664 
In spite of the express terms of the contract, the Michigan court 
declined to permit a forfeiture of the payments made. The underlying 
principle of the decision is not new to equity jurisprudence. "Equity abhors 
a forfeiture." The treatment accorded the express provisions of the mort-
-gage is closely analogous. Richmond v. Robinso1i, 12 Mich. 193· The inter-
esting feature of the decision in the principal case is the fact that the court, 
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in decreeing specific performance, brushes aside the express terms of the 
contract, and in an attempt to adjust the rights of the litigants equitably, lays 
. down its own terms. The equity of the plaintiff's position was far from strong. 
He had no better excuse for the delay in payment than oversight, and he 
had permitted waste on the premises. Consequently, his remissness was 
very properly reflected in the decree. Note that he was required, as a con-
dition precedent to receiving conveyance, to pay the entire unpaid purchase 
price within 30 days, although under the terms of the contract he would 
have had some 28. years in which to pay. It has been argued that the court 
must enforce the contract literally or not at all,-that it cannot make over 
the agreement of the parties. But this argument is not tenable. Decreeing 
relief lies wholly within the discretion of the court and the terms of relief 
may be moulded to fit the circumstances of each case. If the plaintiff's 
equities are strong the decree may be lenient; if weak, harsh; if too weak, 
relief may be refused altogether. Or4inarily, however, compensation can 
be required for the delay without punishing it by forfeiture. In Nayes v. 
Bragg, 220 Mass. 106, another suit by vendee against vendor, it is true that 
the appellate court reversed the superior court, which had ordered present 
payment of future installments, and ordered the contract to be performed 
literally according to its terms, thereby giving the vendee the benefit of the 
installment plan of payment. However, in that controversy the vendor was 
at fault and the conduct of the vendee was unimpeachable. In King v: 
Ruckman, 24 N. J. Eq. 556, the court, instead of accelerating the date of 
payment, as in the principal case, or enforcing the terms of the contract 
literally, as in Noyes v. Bragg, actually extended the time of payment beyond 
that agreed to by the parties. The vendor had wrongfully kept the vendee 
from taking possession for five years beyond the agreed date, and he was 
very properly penalized for his conduct. So the terms of the contract are 
not necessarily sacred. Yet courts have not always recognized the possi-
bility of the decree cy pres, and have often contented themselves with a 
literal enforcement of the contract or nothing. The obvious equity of a 
modification of the agreed terms under certain circumstances compels com-
mendation of such action. The chancellor is thereby given a really effective 
weapon for the enforcement of fair dealing in business transactions. The 
principal case is worthy of note as an illustration of the exercise of such 
power. 
STATU'J.'J; OF FRAUDS-SUFFI<:mNCY OF M£MORANDUM-0MISSION OF fiRM 
FAvoRAnr.:e '.rO TH£ D:eF:eNDANT.-Vendee seeking specific performance of a 
contract for sale of land, stated as one of the terms agreed upon that he 
(vendee) was to assume a mortgage for $800 then existing on the property, 
and to give an additional mortgage for $1,200 to make up the $2,000 balance 
which would be due under the contract. The memorandum offered to prove 
the contract, although apparently sufficient in all respects to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds, made no mention of this mortgage of $8oo or its assump-
tion by the vendee, but indicated rather that the vendee was to give a mort-
gage for the entire $2,000. Held, by a divided court, that the memorandum 
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was insufficient because of the omission of this term. Ge11dlema1i v. M 011-
gillo (Conn., 1921), II4 Atl. 914 
· On its face the majority view seems merely to be in accord with the 
established rule that the memorandum must includ'e all the essential terms. 
agreed upon and that the time and manner of payment are essential terms. 
Baird Inv. Co. v. Harris, 209 Fed. 291; Lester v. Heidt, 86 Ga. 226, IO L. R. 
A,. 108; Ebert v. Culleii, 165 Mich. 75, 33 L. R A. [n. s.] 84. It is probably 
true that the parties to the transaction did not themselves ·regard the omitted 
term as essential, since they did not deem' it necessary to include it in a 
memorandum which was in other respects apparently complete, nor did 
defendant object to its sufficiency on this ground at the trial. But what the 
parties thought cannot be allowed to modify the requirements of the statute. 
Wright v. Weeks, 25 N. Y. 153; Stewart v. Cook, n8 Ga. 541; Hamby v. 
Trnitt, 14 Ga. Ap. 515. On another ground, however, the correctness of 
the decision is not so evident. It is difficult to understand in what way the 
term omitted from the memorandum could be detrimental to the vendor. 
Presumably, it was for his benefit-e. g., to save him the trouble of paying 
off this mortgage and then accepting one for a like amount from the vendee 
as part of the purchase price. In England it has been held that where the 
memorandum omits a term of the verbal agreement which is for the defendt. 
·ant's benefit the defendant cannot set up the statute if the plaintiff is will-
ing to admit this term as part of the contract. Martin v. Pycroft, 2 D. M. 
& G. 785. See also Vouill01~ v. States, 25 L. J. (Ch.) 875, and North v. 
Loonies [1919], i Ch. 378. There appear to be no American decisions 
directly in accord with the English case, but even so, it is somewhat difficult 
to understand why the court in the principal case should have been so solici-
tous for the defendant's rights under the statute. Surely nothing could be 
further from the intent and spirit of the Statute of Frauds than putting a 
penalty upon the plaintiff's honesty in offering the defendant the benefit of 
a term which he, the defendant, would himself have been prevented from 
claiming by operation of the statute and the parol evidence rule. It is to 
be regretted if the English modification· is not open to adoption by the Amer-
ican courts, as this decision by the Connecticut court would seem to indicate. 
It may be observed, however, that there is no indication in the court's opin-
ion that these English authorities were called to its notice. 
TroAL-GENI>RAL EXCEPTION TO INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN ro JURY.-Where the 
record showed an absence of exceptions to the charge, but counsel averred 
that he had' asked for an exception and the court sealed it for him mmc pro 
tune, this was regarded as a general exception to the charge, but held that 
under a general exception only such matters as were basic and fundamental 
could be assigned as error. Marshall v. Carr (Pa., 1921), II4 Atl. 500. 
This decision is in accord with previous Pennsylvania decisions on this 
question, and the courts of that state have declared the following to be ba.i;ic 
and fundamental errors and assignable under a general exception: "All 
actual errors of law"; "material matter so inadequately presented as to be. 
likely to mislead the jury''; "failure of whole charge to present the material 
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issues involved in the case." Sikorski v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1918), 
260 Pa. 243; Mastel .v. Walker (1914), 246 Pa. 65. But basic and funda-
mental errors were not ordinarily assignable under a general exception. The 
courts would not look for "errors of law" within a charge, but only to the 
charge as a whole. "A general exception to the charge brings before the 
court only its propriety as a whole. And if, as a whole, it is not a mis-
direction, not calculated to mislead the jury, the judgment will not be 
reversed." THOMPSON oN TluALs (Ed. 2), Vol. II, p. 1650. "It is well set-
tled that if a series of propositions be embodied in instructions, and the 
instructions be excepted to in a mass, if any one of the propositions be cor-
rect the exception must be overruled." Johnston v. Jones (1861), I Black 
220; Rogers v. the Marshal (1863), 1 Wall. 644 Where the appellant 
requested! four charges and excepted generally to the court's refusal to give 
them, held the request w'as in bulk, and the exception must fail if any one 
charge so requested was bad. Gains v. State, (1907), 149 Ala. 29. But where 
a special charge was requested and refused, and general exception taken 
to the whole charge, the request to charge was held to sufficiently call the 
attention of the court to the special charge, and its refusal was assignable 
under the general exception. Fitzgerald v. Metropolita1~ Life Ins. Co. (Vt., 
1916), g8 Atl. 4g8. Where the appellant excepted generally and had asked 
an instruction that there was no evidence to support a verdict for plaintiff, 
held that the question raised by the charge whether the expense of a trip 
be deducted from the recovery was not assignable. Ra1~om & Randolph 
Co. v. Pinches (1916), 234 Fed. 847. The principal case seems liberal in 
giving the appellant the full benefit of his exception. The assignment of 
basic and fundamental errors under general exception is so valuable a right 
that where a general exception is not allowed by the court, because of the 
allowance of a number of special exceptions, this is held to be reversible 
error. Torak v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1915), 6o Pa. Sup. Ct. 248. 
~ 
WILI,S-LAttNT AMBIGUITY-ADMISSION OF ORAI. DECI.ARATIONS OF TES-
TATOR.-The testatrix, by her will, gave the residue of her estate in the fol-
·lowing words, "to my heirs and to be distributed to them according to law." 
This action was brought to secure an order of distribution to all the heirs 
under the terms of the will At the trial the blood relatives of the testatrix 
offered to prove certain oral declarations of the testatrix, made at the time 
of the execution of the will, to show that the word's above quoted were 
intended to refer only to her own kin. Held, that this evidence was prop-
erly excluded. fore Watts' Estate (Calif., 1921), lg8 Pac. 1036. 
This case was decided on the basis of Sections 1318 and 1340 of the 
California Civil Code, which provide for the explanation· of latent ambigui-
ties in wills by extrinsic evidence, but provide specifically that evidence of 
testator's declarations are inadmissible. But it seems likely that the holding 
would have been the same had there been no provision of the statute rela-
tive thereto, for it has been long .established: that parol evidence cannot be 
admitted to add to, contradict, or vary the contents of the will. See note 
in 17 MICH. L. REv. 178. In Day v. Webler, 93 Conn. 3o8, the scrivener was 
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allowed to testify as to declarations made by the testatrix regarding the 
use of the term "children" in her will. On appeal, this was assigned as 
error, and the court held that the evidence should not have been admitted. 
The court there says, "what he has written determines the testator's intent, 
and where the language is clear and precise, and, the person or thing exists 
and is accurately named, extrinsic circumstances surrounding the testator 
cannot detach the langnage used from its primary significance. Extrinsic 
circumstances may explain the language of the will: they cannot contradict, 
vary, or control it." See also Williams v. Williams, 182 Ky. 738; Lamb v. 
Jordan, 233 Mass. 335. In re Spencer's, EstaJe, 181 Cal. 514, held that inter-
pretive testimony was inadmissible to show that the word "personal" in a 
residuary bequest to "personal legatees named" in the will was not used to 
differentiate people from corporations named, but to distinguish personal 
friends from relatives. The court there said, "there is no ambiguity in the 
language, and: therefore no reason for interpretive testimony. We know of 
no use of the word 'personal,' either technical or colloquial, which would 
justify its employ111ent in distinguishing those not related from those who 
are." The same situation existed in the principal case. The word "heirs" 
can admit of only one legal interpretation, as far as this case is concerned, 
and to admit extrinsic evidence to show that something different was meant 
would be to allow the oral declarations of the testator to be substituted for 
the written will. 
WILLS-VALID IN PART AND Vom IN PART--EFFEC'l' oF Vom Cr.Aus~s 
UPON PROBA~D Wn.r..-After providing that no property was to be sold for 
a period of fifty years after the probate of his will at which time the prop-
erty was to be sold and the proceeds distributed in accordance with its pro-
visions, the testator devised all of his property to his daughter forever, 
but if she died without issue, then to the nephews and nieces of his own 
blood. The daughter died without issue. The nephews and nieces claimed 
under the will and it was contended that the clause suspending alienation 
being void, the whole will was void~ Held, as the devise to the nephews and 
nieces was not dependent in any way upon the void clause, and as the prop-
erty would go to those to whom the testator intended it should go, the void 
clause might be struck out and the valid part allowed to stand. Quilliam v. 
U11io1i Trust Co. (Ind., 19~u), 131 N. E. 428. 
The general rule seems to be that where there are valid and invalid 
clauses in the same will, the good will be allowed to stand; unless the valid 
and invalid clauses are so closely connected as to constitute one entire 
scheme for the disposition of the estate, so that the presumed wishes of 
the testator would be defeated if one portion were retained and the other 
portion rejected. The big question, therefore, is, when are clauses so closely 
connected that by retaining a part and rejecting the others the intention of 
the testator is thereby defeated? The distinction lies in the scheme, or lack 
of a scheme, employed by the testator in disposing of his property. If the 
testator devises directly to the beneficiaries, and a future interest created 
by the same instrument is void, the prior interests become what they would 
RECENT IMPORT ANT DECISIONS 253 
have been had the limitation of the future estates been omitted from the 
instrument. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPSTUITmS, par. 247, 248, and cases 
there cited. Where, however, the testator does not devise directly to bene-
ficiaries, but creates a trust and seeks to dispose of his property by that 
means, the valid and invalid clauses are not independent, but are links in 
one entire scheme created to carry out a common purpose. To execute only 
a part would be to make a new will for the testator, and therefore the whole 
trust must stand or fall together. Barrett v. Barrett, 225 Ill. 332; Reid v. 
Voorhees, 216 Ill. 236. In the latter case the argument was advanced that 
if the interest covered by the valid clauses would not be changed by excluding 
the invalid clauses, the good should be allowed to stand. The court said 
this was in disregard of the cardinal principle of wills, for by the trust the 
testator had created one entire scheme for the disposal of all his property, 
and to hold that his scheme must fail in so far as he sought to dispose of 
the corpus of his estate, but might be sustained as to the life estates, would 
be to make a will which the testator never intended. In the above cases the 
void clauses disposed of the corpus of the estate. Where the testator devised 
his property in trust, and the void clauses disposed of life interests, or were 
limitations over after a fee, and the corpus of the estate was covered by 
the valid clauses, the good were allowed to stand. Herron v. Stanton (Ind., 
1920), 128 N. E. 363; fore Thaw (1917), 169 N. Y. Supp. 430. In Tyler v. 
Fidelity Trust Co., 158 Ky. 280, a trust was created for the disposal of the 
property and the clause disposing of the corpus of the estate was void. The 
court allowed the valid clauses to stand and held that the modern rule per-
mits the estate to progress under the will up to the point where the rule 
against perpetuities begins to operate. In that case, however, the beneficiaries 
under the will were the same persons who would have taken under the statute 
of descent and distribution. The result of the cases seems to be that in 
cases of trusts, if the primary purpose of the testator is accomplished by 
probating the valid portions, they will be allowed' to stand, provided no mani-
fest injustice would result to the beneficiaries by such a construction. Such 
an injustice results when the beneficiaries under the valid clauses would not 
only take under the will but would also share in the property covered by 
the invalid clauses if it were declared intestate. Benedict v. Webb, 98 N. Y. 
460; Reid v. Voorhees, supra. In Beatty v. Stanley (Ill., 1921), 131 N. E. 
687, the testator made bequests of personalty and then devised all his realty 
in trust. The trust was void and the court held that the bequests must also 
fall. In that case the beneficiaries of the bequests would! share in the intes-
tate property, but as the beneficiaries of the invalid clauses would not, it is 
difficult to see how any injustice would result. 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-"AccIDENTAI, INJURy''-INJURY CAUSED BY 
Exc1TEMENT.-The plaintiff, while performing his duties as foreman in the 
defendant's coal yard, became engaged in a heated argument with a teamster. 
Threats were made, but no blows were struck. A few minutes later the 
plaintiff suffered a cerebral hemorrhage which caused a paralytic stroke. 
Held, the plaintiff is not entitled to compensatioµ under the Workmen's Com-
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pensation Act. Ideal Fuel Co. v. Industrial Com. et al., (Ill., 1921), 131 N. 
E. 649. 
The ratio decide11di is not clearly stated. The court says that there is 
not adequate proof that the quarrel caused the injury. If this is the real 
ground for its holding, the result, undoubtedly, is correct. On the other hand, 
the court seems to doubt whether a physical injury due to fright or excite-
ment can be the basis for liability. Apparently, the reason for its reluctance 
in admitting liability in such cases is the doctrii{'e in tort law which denies 
recovery for physical injury due to~ mental or nervous shock and not to a 
physical impact. See Braim v. Crave1i, 175 Ill. 40I. In recent years many 
courts have frankly abandoned this rule. See I8 MICH. L. R.Ev. 332, com-
menting upon Janvier v. Sweeney, [I9I9], 2 K. B. 3I6, where the court 
allowed recovery for illness resulting from a nervous shock induced by 
false words and threats upon the part of the defendant. There the writer 
points out that the only reasons advanced in support of the old rule are 
without foundation in fact. See, also, 4I AM. LAW. Rm. I4I. In the first 
cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act the courts emphasized the 
idea of an external injury to the physical structure of the body. 25 HARV. 
L. R.Ev. 337. Then it was held that even the bacillus of anthrax could fur-
nish the necessary physical phenomenon. Brintons, Limited, v. Turuey,_ 
[I905], A. C. 230; also, Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Com., 29I 
Ill. 6!6. Soon this unsatisfactory test was discarded. Recovery was allowed 
for any disease of sudden origin: (heat from furnace), Isma'y, Imrie & Co. 
v. Williamson, [I908], A. C. 437; (sunstroke), Morgaii v. S. S. Zenaida, 25 
T. L. R. 446. Also for intern:il physical injuries due to one's own muscular 
exertion. Clover, Clayto1i & Co., Ltd., v. Hughes, [I910], A. C. 242; Baggot 
Co. v. Industrial Cam., 290 Ill. 530, 7 A. L. R. I6II. See Crosby v. Thorp, 
Hawley & Co., 2o6 Mich. 250, 6 A. L. R. I253, commented upon in I8 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 72, and cited with approval by the court. Then in Yates v. South 
Kirkby, etc., Collieries, Ltd., [1910], 2 K. B. 538, where the plaintiff was 
incapacitated by a nervous shock caused by the excitement and alarm result-
ing from a fatal accident to a fellO\V workman, the court allowed compen-
sation. One judge said, "In my opinion, nervous shock due to accident 
which causes personal incapacity to work is as much 'personal injury by acci-
dent' as a broken leg." A rule, like that suggested by the principal case, 
which would make the right to compensation depend not on the injury but 
on the character of the means producing it, is both illogical and unjust. 
